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INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Roberts at his confirmation hearings notably claimed that the judiciary should properly play only a minimalist, restrained role in our modern democracy. 1 In contrast with this view of the modest role the judiciary ought to play, Chief Justice Roberts and his conservative colleagues have stated grave concerns about the "vast power" that administrative agencies "wield" over regulated parties. 2 Central to reducing these concerns is a strong role of review to be played by the federal courts.' The Roberts Court has found it difficult to balance judicial restraint with a perceived need to constrain administrative power when the Court decides administrative restraint is needed.
One would expect that a restrained Court would, at a minimum, resolve preliminary, technical issues before finding it necessary to confront other, more controversial issues. Recent decisions by the Roberts Court, however, suggest that the Court may actively seek to redefine administrative law without the constraints that the more mundane norms of decision making and legal doctrines impose on the development of law. Notwithstanding the protestations of the Chief Justice, his Court has decided to resolve issues at the heart of modem administrative law, even though more modest, more restrained options were available. Such decisions cast doubt on the Chief Justice's claim of judicial restraint. 4 The most obvious example of an activist Court reaching out to redefine administrative law is Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Board. 5 There, the Chief Justice wrote the opinion for the conservative majority and struck down as unconstitutional a limitation on the President's removal power. The Court established a broad new constitutional rule limiting the independence of agencies 6 ' City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Our duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our duty to respect that between the Judiciary and the Executive. In the present context, that means ensuring that the Legislative Branch has in fact delegated law making power to an agency within the Executive Branch, before the Judiciary defers to the Executive on what the law is. That concern is heightened, not diminished, by the fact that the administrative agencies, as a practical matter, draw upon a potent brew of executive, legislative, and judicial power. And it is heightened, not diminished, by the dramatic shift in power over the last [fifty] years from Congress to the Executive-a shift effected through the administrative agencies.") (citation omitted)); cf Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 , 1374 (2012 ("The Government warns that the [Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA')] is less likely to use the orders if they are subject to judicial review. That may be true-but it will be true for all agency actions subjected to judicial review. The [Administrative Procedure Act's] presumption of judicial review is a repudiation of the principle that efficiency of regulation conquers all. And there is no reason to think that the Clean Water Act was uniquely designed to enable the strong-arming of regulated parties into 'voluntary compliance' without the opportunity for judicial review-even judicial review of the question whether the regulated party is within the EPA's jurisdiction.") (citation omitted).
Justice dissented. Both Justices decided to resolve a foundational question regarding the scope of Chevron deference without first considering the threshold question defined by the Court's decision in Mead whether Chevron deference properly applied. As to that question, the Court should have come to the straightforward conclusion that Chevron simply did not apply to the review of the FCC's decision."°T his article will discuss how this recent decision illustrates that the Roberts Court is neither restrained nor minimalist in its efforts to shape administrative law.
I. THE DECISION BEING REVIEWED
A proper understanding of the Court's activism necessitates a review of the Fifth Circuit's decision in City of Arlington v. FCC." That court's application of administrative law was surprising and worthy of reversal. That the court's decision was reviewed and affirmed by the Supreme Court indicates that the Court had a different objective.
12
The FCC plays the critical regulatory role over cellular phone operations.' 3 Those operations are dependent on the use of local antennas attached to towers.
14 Local government has some regulatory authority over these towers because of
The Court decided the case based on the parties' agreement that members of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") may be removed by the President only for cause. Id. at 486-87. In his dissent, Justice Breyer chided the Court for deciding an important constitutional question based on an assumption made by the parties. Id. at J., dissenting) . He argued that the statutory issue was "certainly not obvious." Id.
zoning and land use law. 5 When Congress amended the Federal Communications Act in 1996, Congress added a requirement that state or local government agencies "act on any request for authorization to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities within a reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed."'
16
In 2008, an association of wireless communications providers petitioned the FCC for a "declaratory ruling" that would impose presumptive limits on the time within which state or local agencies would have to decide on cell phone tower requests filed by providers. 7 The FCC published a notice of the petition and "received dozens of comments from wireless service providers, local zoning authorities, and other interested parties."'" The FCC thereafter issued its Declaratory Ruling, establishing presumptive limits for the "reasonable period of time" permitted by the statute. 19 That ruling was then challenged in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
The parties challenging the ruling argued first that the FCC had promulgated a regulation without complying with the Administrative Procedure Act's (the "APA") requirements for informal rulemaking.° The FCC had two responses to this challenge: The agency asserted that its action on the petition was an adjudication rather than a rulemaking, and, alternatively, that if the agency had issued rules, those rules were interpretive.
2 ' The agency notably did not claim that it had promulgated a legislative rule. The FCC contended that under either of 15 Id.
16 Id. at 1866 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2012)).
7
The petition was quite detailed in specifying the requirements that the providers believed to be appropriate. Id. at 234-35.
I' 8 d. at 235.
'9 The Declaratory Ruling provided that the statutory 'reasonable period of time' ... presumptively would be 90 days for personal wireless service facility siting applications requesting collocations and 150 days for all other applications." Id. (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted). The Ruling also provided that "although the 90-and 150-day time frames established by the Declaratory Ruling were presumptively reasonable, state or local authorities would have the opportunity in any given case to rebut that presumption in court." Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
theory, the agency was not required to comply with informal rulemaking requirements.
22
The Fifth Circuit initially concluded, in agreement with the agency's characterization of its action, that the FCC had engaged in an informal adjudication when it issued its Declaratory Ruling. 23 The Court then turned its attention to the question whether the agency had been arbitrary or capricious in deciding to proceed by adjudication, rather than rulemaking. 24 On this question, the court "harbor [ed] serious doubts., 25 The court had such "doubts" because the results of the agency's action-presumptively unreasonable time limits for action by a local agency-"bear all the hallmarks of products of rulemaking, not adjudication,, 26 and did, indeed, constitute "classic rulemaking."
27
The agency, of course, had not complied with the APA § 553 requirements for notice and comment rulemaking, a failure that the city claimed was unlawful.
28
The agency provided its response to this claimed illegality: The APA did not require compliance with § 553 because the rulemaking had been interpretive and thus exempt from the procedural requirements.
29 Such an argument ought to have appealed to the court because it had earlier used language suggesting exactly that conclusion when it characterized the FCC's action as "ha [ving] provided guidance on the meaning of § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v) that is utterly divorced from any any specific dispute between a wireless provider and a state or local government, but in a proceeding focused exclusively on providing an interpretation of § 332(c)(7)(B) that would apply prospectively to every state and local government in the United States."). The court's conclusion that the ruling was not an adjudication was reinforced by the court's rejection of the petitioners' argument that the agency violated Due Process by failing to provide notice to localities whose practices were challenged by the petition for a ruling. Id. at 246. The court held that such individual notice was not required because the agency "was not adjudicating the legality of the actions of those state and local governments." Id.
27 Id. at 243 ("This is classic rulemaking.").
2 ' Id. at 240.
29 Id. at 243 ("We also do not address the FCC's argument that, even if it did engage in rulemaking, the rulemaking was interpretative rulemaking of the type excepted from the APA's notice-and-comment requirements."). Having rejected this coherent response to the claimed procedural violation, the court concluded instead that the FCC's failure to comply with § 553 was harmless error. 32 The court concluded that the petitioners had received adequate notice and opportunity for comment and that the agency had considered all of the substantive issues that the petitioners were advocating before the Court of Appeals.
MEANS AND ENDS IN

33
The court then turned its attention to the challenges to the FCC's substantive determination of time frames for local agencies' decisions on petitions. The first such challenge, later reviewed by the Supreme Court, was that "the FCC lacked the statutory authority to adopt the 90-and 150-day time frames." 34 The FCC replied to this contention by relying on its general rulemaking authority. 35 In summarizing the argument, the court did not reflect on the irony of the agency's argument: The FCC had not purported to exercise that power when it issued the Declaratory Ruling.
36
The court then proceeded to its analysis, which began immediately with application of Chevron: "We ordinarily review an agency's interpretation of the statutes it is charged with administering using the Chevron two-step standard of review. The court then proceeded to its consideration of whether the time limits identified by the FCC were permissible. The court again made no mention of the Mead analysis in determining the applicable review standard: Chevron or Skidmore. The court again proceeded immediately to an application of Chevron review. The court concluded that the statute is "inherently ambiguous" on the question of the meaning of "a reasonable period of time." 50 The court then concluded that the FCC's interpretation was reasonable. Court engaged in an elaborate analysis of the lawmaking authority that Congress had delegated to the Department of Justice (the "DOJ") under the Controlled Substances Act (the "CSA") to determine whether Congress had delegated to the DOJ the power to define as unlawful the prescribing of drugs to allow euthanasia in Oregon, a state that had permitted such practices. The Court's analysis, which considered the scope of authority delegated to the agency under two different provisions and involved the application of canons and presumptions of meaning, involved the Court discerning Congress' intended delegation to the DOJ and plainly did not involve any deference to the agency. 63 The Court concluded that there had been no delegation of lawmaking power to the DOJ regarding the particular decision it had made, although the DOJ had received delegated lawmaking power to address other regulatory matters.
5
II. THE MINIMALIST, RESTRAINED APPROACH TO REVIEW
64
Of course, it would not have made sense for the Court to have accorded deference to an agency on the question whether Congress had delegated lawmaking power to the agency. Such an application of the Mead analysis conflicts with the separate role defined for courts and agencies in determining the content of public law. The court alone has the power to interpret a statute in order to determine the 60 City ofArlington, 668 F.3d at 247. 
63
See id. at 258-69. Notably, the Court relied on the elephants-in-mouseholes canon in concluding that " [t] he idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation in the CSA's registration provision is not sustainable." Id. at 267. content of the law enacted by Congress, including the nature of the authority that Congress has delegated to an agency. 65 Moreover, according deference to the agency on the question whether Congress delegated lawmaking power simply conflicts directly with the basic theory of Mead. Mead's purpose and effect are lost if a court is to accord proper Chevron deference to the agency when the court is deciding whether to accord Chevron deference. Mead held that such deference is not to be accorded to an agency's legal interpretation until after the court itself has decided whether Congress intended such deference based on the congressional delegation of lawmaking power and the agency's exercise of that power.
66 Such congressional intent may be determined by a court based on a presumption of the sort that Justice Scalia identified in his decision: the presumption that a broad grant of rulemaking power is a grant of such authority as to any application of the statute. 67 This is a presumption that may properly answer the first of the two Mead questions that determine whether Chevron deference applies. This would not, however, in any sense itself be an application of Chevron deference, which Mead holds is not applicable until each of the two threshold questions is answered in the affirmative. 67 City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874 ("What the dissent needs, and fails to produce, is a single case in which a general conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative authority has been held insufficient to support Chevron deference for an exercise of that authority within the agency's substantive field. There is no such case, and what the dissent proposes is a massive revision of our Chevron jurisprudence."). The FCC argued that Congress had delegated broad lawmaking power to the agency. Brief for Federal Respondents at 10-14, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013 ) (No. 11-1545 . The FCC argued that given the broad congressional delegation, the conclusion that Congress delegated lawmaking power to the FCC regarding the antenna provision was correct regardless of whether the determination was reviewed de novo. Id. at 13-14. FCC] dissent's proposition that, 'Whether Congress has conferred such power is the "relevant questional of law" that must be answered before affording Chevron deference,' without at all having to agree that 'the question whether an agency enjoys that authority must be decided by a court, without deference to the agency.' Without Chevron deference, yes; without Skidmore deference, no."). The Petitioner advanced this same argument in its Reply Brief. See Reply Brief for Petitioners City of Arlington et al.
In City of Arlington, reasonable minds may have differed on the question whether Congress delegated to the FCC lawmaking power to define the duration of a "reasonable period." 69 No such difference of opinion should be present regarding the agency's self-avowed failure actually to exercise lawmaking power, even assuming the delegation by Congress.
7
" Indeed, a court performing the Mead analysis in City of Arlington would almost surely have decided that it was unnecessary to resolve the disputed question of the scope of delegated lawmaking power, because the second Mead condition clearly had not been met.
' The FCC had informed the court that the agency had not intended to promulgate a substantive rule, that is, a rule that the agency intended to define new law. 72 70 But cf Strauss, supra note 68, at 6 ("That the Chevron framework would apply [in City ofArlington] was to some extent a forgone conclusion-the FCC was acting formally, with evident juris-generative intent.").
7'
The Petitioner's discussion of the Mead analysis in its brief addressed only the first part of the Mead analysis, whether Congress had delegated lawmaking power to the agency. See generally Brief for Petitioners, supra note 69. The brief, however, ignored the second Mead requirement-the agency must have exercised its lawmaking power, assuming it had been delegated. In sum, standard analysis mandated by the Supreme Court's decision in Mead would have established that the FCC was not owed Chevron deference. The case, in short, was surely one that did not warrant any discussion about the scope of deference, or they can opt to issue these interpretations informally as interpretive rules, in which case they will have to defend their interpretations under the less deferential Skidmore standard. But they have to select one or the other. This "pay me now or pay me later" principle has gradually emerged as a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to avoid direct regulation of agency choice of policymaking form while retaining some form of meaningful check-either ex ante procedural safeguards or ex post judicial scrutiny--on administrative decisions.
See also Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, Ill MICH. L. REV. 355, 398-99 (2012) ("As reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in [Mead] , statutory authority alone is not sufficient to warrant deference under Chevron; the agency's reason-giving is a precondition to, and the object of, deference. In other words, the agency's reasoned analysis is the coin by which it pays for (and warrants) deference to its interpretation of the law.") (footnotes omitted).
5 See Healy, supra note 46, at 41-42 n.263. 76 In its Appellee's Brief, the FCC barely mentioned the second Mead requirement, that the agency actually have acted in the exercise of delegated lawmaking power. It stated only that the FCC order was "the result of an adjudication" and that the court of appeals found the agency's use of an adjudication, rather than a rulemaking, to be harmless error. See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 34-35 n.8, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 Ct. (2013 (No. 11-1545) . The FCC appeared quite content to submerge the matter of the procedural formalities to a single footnote. Procedural formalities are critical, however, to the determination of the proper standard ofjudicial review. See supra note 74. 
III. THE ACTIVIST DECISIONS OF THE JUSTICES
The Supreme Court's decision affirming the Fifth Circuit is most notable for undercutting the Court's post-Mead regime for reviewing agency legal determinations, particularly the rules for defining when a court must defer to an agency's legal determination.
7 9 The fact that none of the opinions written by the Justices directly presented the proper framework for analysis shows either that the Court itself does not understand how the framework should be applied or that the Justices simply viewed the case as a vehicle to accomplish other jurisprudential goals.
8 " Those goals for the principal antagonists here were to expand (Justice Scalia) or to contract (Chief Justice Roberts) the scope of application of Chevron deference.
A. Justice Scalia's Majority Opinion
The past decade or so has not been kind to Justice Scalia regarding his views of the proper review standard for agency legal determinations. Justice Scalia was a lone voice in decrying the Court's decision in United States v. Mead, which defined the two-part test for the application of Chevron deference. Justice Scalia must therefore have been delighted to craft a decision for the Court majority on an issue that appeared to test the scope of application of Chevron deference. He very likely saw the case as providing an opportunity to further two related goals. First, he would be able to ensure broad reach of Chevron's application by holding that the doctrine applied even when an agency was determining the scope of its own jurisdiction. Second, he would limit the effect of Mead by establishing that Chevron deference is owed to an agency's determination that Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the agency.
For the Court's decision in City of Arlington to serve these related goals, however, Justice Scalia had to be purposefully obscure and disingenuous in the review of an agency determination that simply should not have received Chevron deference under Mead. Justice Scalia's trope is simple, yet obscure: He changes the shape of his discussion of Chevron from a discussion of the application of Chevron deference to his discussion of "the Chevron framework." His unstated hope seems to be that Mead will be forgotten and its impact undone if the Supreme Court is seen as accepting the application of Chevron in cases and in contexts in which there is very good reason to doubt the applicability of Chevron deference post-Mead.
86
Justice Scalia's jurisprudential strategy to redefine the scope of Chevron's applicability echoes the strategy that Justice Brennan pursued more than a quartercentury ago as he sought to shape the law governing the permissibility of adjudication by non-Article III adjudicators. Justice Brennan opposed the adjunct of the court doctrine, which permitted a non-Article III tribunal to adjudicate private rights if the tribunal was a proper adjunct to an Article III court. Brennan sought to define a bright line rule that would determine the permissibility of adjudication by a non-Article III tribunal, and he wished to draw that line solely by reference to whether the matter involved the adjudication of private or public rights."
Shaping such a legal rule was difficult because the Court had decided cases in this area employing more flexible standards that accounted for circumstances other than only the nature of the rights being adjudicated. 89 Justice Brennan apparently lacked the votes to overrule that standards-based approach, so he simply decided to expand the scope of private rights cases and view all of the cases that the Court had permitted to be adjudicated by non-Article III tribunals as public rights cases.
90
Although Justice Brennan's strategy appeared to succeed when he gathered a majority of votes in Granfinanciera, 9 ' its failure was clear when the Court recently reaffirmed that prior cases had indeed held that a non-Article III tribunal may adjudicate private rights, provided that the tribunal is properly an adjunct of the court. 92 Time will tell whether Justice Scalia's effort to undo the consequences of
Mead by defining an enlarged "Chevron framework" will also fail.
Justice Scalia's effort to make the scope of "the Chevron framework" synonymous with the scope of Chevron deference must be rejected for three reasons. First, Justice Scalia is being disingenuous at best in his undefended view that cases decided at step one of Chevron-cases in which the statute is clear in foreclosing an agency's interpretation-are in any meaningful sense Chevron cases. 93 In Justice Scalia's zeal to present a strong claim that Chevron properly adjudication because the case involved the adjudication of congressionally-created rights rather than private rights). 95 To be sure, the agencies in those cases acted to define controversially the broad scope of their regulatory authority. 96 The agencies in those cases would undoubtedly be surprised, however, to find the Court describing them as Chevron cases. In each of these cases, the Court held that the agency lacked the delegated authority claimed by the agency because the Court alone decided that the statute clearly foreclosed the agency's legal interpretation. 97 Surely in neither case did the Court defer to the agency's interpretation. 98 The scope of application of Chevron deference, of course, is the matter at issue in City ofArlington.
To describe the first step of the analysis defined by Chevron as Chevron review is, post-Mead, at best misleading. If Mead had never been decided, there would be neither harm nor misdirection in the claim that Chevron review is comprised of the two steps famously identified in that case. In truth, however, the differences between the two steps are critical in the post-Mead world of administrative law and must be distinguished so that the scope of proper Chevron deference can be demarcated. The first step described by Chevron involves the court's exercise of its own interpretive authority in deciding whether a statute is clear in defining the law.
99 When a court exercises this interpretive authority, the ("As part of its step one determination, a court might well turn to a responsible agency's judgment about the matter as one weight to be considered on the scales the court is using. That is, Skidmore deference is one of those 'traditional tools of statutory interpretation' that bear on a court's independent conclusion about the extent of agency authority."). Congress has left ambiguous. If the former, statutory meaning is set; consistent agency interpretations should be upheld on the court's own authority, while contrary constructions must be rejected. If the latter, agency interpretations that do not fall within the zone of indeterminacy permitted by the statute's language must be struck down. This constitutes the scope of the independent judicial task."); see also Strauss, Overseers, supra note 100, at 818 ("Defining the areas of ambiguity within which, Chevron says, agencies have presumptively the leading oar is a part of the independent judicial task of step one.").
102 See Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:
Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1253, 1260-61 (1997) ("Under the structure of the Chevron formula, a court should not reach step two unless it has already found during step one that the statute supports the government's interpretation or at least is ambiguous with respect to it. In other words, the agency's view is not clearly contrary to the meaning of the statute. If the court has made such a finding, one would think that the govemment's interpretation must be at least 'reasonable' in the court's eyes."). By misleadingly claiming an overly broad scope of Chevron review-"the Chevron framework"-Justice Scalia is able to describe cases as Chevron cases, despite the fact that there was no deference to an agency because a clear statute as determined by the court resolved the interpretive question. Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.... Only a judicial precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the agency's interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction."); id. at 985 ("Before a judicial construction of a statute, whether contained in a precedent or not, may trump an agency's, the court must hold that the statute unambiguously requires the court's construction.").
its lawmaking power, and the new interpretation will receive Chevron deference (assuming that Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the agency).
07
Because the first step under either regime would be identical, it would be unnecessary judicial analysis to perform the potentially difficult Mead analysis in a case in which the statute would be found clear in either event. In short, the Court erred in its failure both to conduct a Mead analysis before addressing the scope of properly applicable Chevron deference and to characterize its initial analysis of whether the statute is clear as Chevron analysis.
Justice Scalia's desire to claim the broadest application of Chevron by discussing the breadth of "the Chevron framework" rather than Chevron deference also fails because it simply proves too much.' The Court in City of Arlington accorded Chevron deference to the agency even though it issued a regulation that the agency did not intend to be an exercise of lawmaking power and which did not conform to the APA's procedural requirements for notice and comment rulemaking.
9 This agency ruling would very likely not have received Chevron deference even before Mead was decided on grounds that the agency had not earned judicial deference because it had relied on the APA exception to rulemaking procedures."1 0 The ruling surely should not receive Chevron deference after Mead.
The danger that City of Arlington poses is that Justice Scalia relied on the assumption or the acceptance that the case was within "the Chevron framework" to enable the conclusion that an agency receives Chevron deference if a statute is not clear about the delegation of lawmaking power. The second, and possibly more important, reason Justice Scalia so strongly objected to Mead was that the decision revived the application of Skidmore ' See Mead, 533 U.S. at 261 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Mead is] one of the most significant opinions ever rendered by the Court dealing with the judicial review of administrative action. Its consequences will be enormous, and almost uniformly bad."); see also id. at 239 ("Today's opinion makes an avulsive change in judicial review of federal administrative action.").
118 See id at 226-27 & 229.
"9 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17 (1998) ("It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver. That seems to me the essence of the famous American ideal set forth in the Massachusetts constitution: A government of laws, not men. Men may intend what they will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us."). 121 See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our job begins with a text that Congress has passed and the President has signed. We are to read the words of that text as any ordinary Member of Congress would have read them, and apply the meaning so determined.") (citation omitted). 125 To be sure, Skidmore review is dependent (as all review standards are) on the good faith of the reviewing court. Skidmore review permits courts to account for the agency's experience and expertise when the court must itself determine the proper meaning of an ambiguous statute and Chevron deference does not apply.' 26 Justice Scalia's claim to abjure broad judicial decision-making authority by advocating the broad scope of "the Chevron framework" should be taken, however, with a very large grain of salt. Justice Scalia has a well-known and often-practiced ability to reject agency interpretations that expand the agencies' regulatory .23 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 ("To agree with the Court of Appeals that Customs ruling letters do not fall within Chevron is not, however, to place them outside the pale of any deference whatever. Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience and broader investigations and information' available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires 125 Justice Scalia expressed his view in Mead that Skidmore review is nothing more than "that test most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect): th' ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test." Mead, 533 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26 It is worth noting that Justice Scalia's rejection of Skidmore review fails to engage with the core of its significance, which is that the court itself has the authority to construe the legal source being interpreted and ought to consider relevant information in reaching its judgment. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 681 (1996) ("[A]n agency's interpretation, ... if not binding upon a reviewing court, retains value as a tool of construction. Congress's decision to commit lawmaking power to agencies vests substantial regulatory authority in specialized bodies with knowledge, expertise, and experience that generalist courts lack. Agencies may therefore have insights into regulatory history, context, or purpose that may not be readily apparent to even the most seasoned federal judge."); see also Peter L. Strauss, "Deference" Is Too Confusing-Let's Call Them "Chevron Space" and "Skidmore Weight," 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1156 (2012) ("What is 'exclusively a judicial function' does not exclude agency views. Once a question of statutory interpretation has been put before a court, it is for the court to resolve the question of meaning. Among the matters indispensable for it to consider, however, are the meanings attributed to it by prior (administrative) interpreters, their stability, and the possibly superior body of information and more embracive responsibilities that underlay them. They may be entitled to great 'weight' on the judicial scales."). Perhaps Justice Scalia simply knows courts too well to support a rule that depends on judicial good faith.
authority.
127 He exercises this judicial power, however, at step one of Chevron by concluding either that the statute is clear 128 or that ambiguity, because of the application of a required clear statement rule, is an insufficient legislative grant of power when the agency is making a decision that has great regulatory effect.
129
Indeed, there is a rich irony that Justice Scalia, who developed and then christened the modem administrative law elephants-in-mouseholes canon, 130 chided Chief Justice Roberts in City ofArlington for supporting a rule that Justice Scalia claimed defined a distinction between big and small questions when deciding whether deference applies.' 3 ' In this regard, it is worth recognizing the different results of judicially active decisions that restrain the regulatory authority of agencies. When, following proper application of the Mead analysis, a court reviews an agency's interpretation under the Skidmore regime and the court interpreting the ambiguous statute reaches a different interpretation than the agency's interpretive conclusion, the agency may, if it has delegated lawmaking power, change the law to its original view, which would be accorded Chevron deference if the agency did later exercise its lawmaking power.' 3 2 When, however, a court employs the elephants-inmouseholes canon and rejects the agency's interpretation under step one of Chevron, an amendment of the statute by Congress is necessary before the agency's interpretation would be permitted (even though the statute is otherwise ambiguous on its face regarding the legal issue). 131 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 Ct. , 1868 Ct. (2013 .
32
This proposition, as is stated, is based on the assumption that Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the agency. Part III.C of this article contends that Chief Justice Roberts is suggesting that courts ought to employ a clear statement rule that requires Congress to delegate lawmaking power expressly before a court should conclude that the agency possesses such power. This interpretive rule would have an effect analogous to the elephants-in-mouseholes canon. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. an agency's conclusion that Congress delegated lawmaking power to the agency. Mead would still, however, require a judicial determination about whether the agency had actually exercised the lawmaking power Congress had delegated to it. If there is no such agency exercise (as there had not been in City of Arlington), there is no Chevron deference, even if a court were to defer to an agency's view that the agency had been delegated (unexercised) lawmaking power.
B. Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer concurs in part and concurs in the Court's judgment. 133 His opinion is much more consistent with the Court's post-Mead regime for review of agency legal interpretations. Nevertheless, his opinion is not nearly as clear as it could be in explaining how City ofArlington ought to fit within that regime. Justice Breyer initially presented Mead as something less than a test that must be applied once a court has determined that a statute is ambiguous. Mead is described as an "example" of how the Court "looked to several factors other than simple ambiguity to help determine whether Congress left a statutory gap, thus delegating to the agency the authority to fill that gap with an interpretation that would carry 'the force of law. Despite this lack of full clarity, Justice Breyer's opinion does provide important insights into the Mead analysis, even though those insights have to be teased out. First, Justice Breyer rejected the view implicitly presented by Justice 133 City ofArlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
'"' Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001) ).
535 U.S. 212 (2002).
136 See id. at 222 (applicable regime is determined based on "the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time"); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1004 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Congress may have intended not to leave the matter of a particular interpretation up to the agency, irrespective of the procedure the agency uses to arrive at that interpretation, say, where an unusually basic legal question is at issue.") (citation omitted). Justice Scalia has criticized Justice Breyer's flexibility in determining whether Chevron deference is to be accorded to an agency's interpretation. See id. at 1015 n.9 (Scalia, J., dissenting). give definitive answers to questions left to them by Congress, but also the same power to decide when Congress has given them that power."'
Scalia, that the
149
The dissent claimed that "it is necessary to sort through some confusion over what this litigation is about. The source of the confusion is a familiar culprit: the concept of 'jurisdiction."" ' 15 1 In the dissent's view, the jurisdictional question presented by the case was whether "a court should not defer to an agency on whether Congress has granted the agency interpretive authority over the statutory ambiguity at issue."
' 151 Unfortunately, the dissent did not establish in clear and direct terms that this is the very question considered as the first half of the Mead analysis (provided that the dissent understood "interpretive authority" as the power to define law on the question). If the dissent had framed the question as one that is at the center of the Mead analysis, the dissent could have demonstrated more clearly that the majority's approach at the very least ignores the application of Mead. The dissent, in other words, confused matters because it failed to clarify that the majority erred when it applied Chevron deference without determining first that each of the two requirements for such deference had been met.
The dissent's brief Part II discussion restated the core principle of Mead that Congress determines whether a court is to defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute. ' The dissent then relied on the separation of powers to reinforce that principle by declaring that "before a court may grant such deference, it must on its own decide whether Congress-the branch vested with law making authority under the Constitution-has in fact delegated to the agency [lawmaking] power over the ambiguity at issue." ' The dissent suggested, moreover, that the ' Id. at 1879. One may wonder why the dissent did not state at this point that Mead had already definitively resolved this question.
151 Id. at 1879-80.
11 See id at 1880.
' Id. (citation omitted). Part Ill of the dissent discussed how the limitation on the scope of deference followed from the Court's decisions in several cases, including Chevron and Mead. See id. at 1881. The dissent's conclusion at the end of Part Ill echoed its conclusion at the end of Part 11: "[W]e do not defer to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous provision unless Congress wants us to, and whether Congress wants us to is a question that courts, not agencies, must decide. Simply put, that question is 'beyond the Chevron pale." ' Id. at 1883 (quoting United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001 ); see also City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1886 ("Chevron importantly guards against the Judiciary arrogating to itself policymaking properly left, under the separation of powers, to the Executive. But there is another concern at play, no less firmly rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the obligation of the Only Part IV of the dissent included analysis that suggested how a judicial review regime motivated by heightened concern about the great authority now exercised by administrative agencies might properly constrain the exercise of such authority. ' Such a limitation could arise from presumptions regarding the congressional delegation of lawmaking power to an agency:
If a congressional delegation of interpretive authority is to support Chevron deference, however, that delegation must extend to the specific statutory ambiguity at issue. The appropriate question is whether the delegation covers the "specific provision" and "particular question" before the court. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. A congressional grant of authority over some portion of a statute does not necessarily mean that Congress granted the agency interpretive authority over all its provisions.1 56 Chief Justice Roberts was focused only on the role that courts must play to ensure that agencies act only in contexts and ways that Congress has given them power to act. His focus was accordingly on the role of courts in defining the limits Judiciary not only to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure that the other branches do so as well.").
"I4 See id at 1886 ("An agency's interpretive authority, entitling the agency to judicial deference, acquires its legitimacy from a delegation of law making power from Congress to the Executive. Our duty to police the boundary between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our duty to respect that between the Judiciary and the Executive. In the present context, that means ensuring that the Legislative Branch has in fact delegated lawmaking power to an agency within the Executive Branch, before the Judiciary defers to the Executive on what the law is. That concem is heightened, not diminished, by the fact that the administrative agencies, as a practical matter, draw upon a potent brew of executive, legislative, and judicial power. And it is heightened, not diminished, by the dramatic shift in power over the last [fifty] years from Congress to the Executive-a shift effected through the administrative agencies.") (citations omitted).
156 Id. (second citation omitted). The Chief Justice did not opine that a proper non-deferential construction of the statute would be that Congress had not delegated to the FCC the power to define law prescribing a "reasonable time" for final local action on antenna applications. The dissent would simply have remanded for reconsideration without according deference to the FCC regarding the scope of the agency's lawmaking power. See id. at 1886 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Because the court should have determined on its own whether Congress delegated interpretive authority over § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) to the FCC before affording Chevron deference, I would vacate the decision below and remand the cases to the Fifth Circuit to perform the proper inquiry in the first instance."). Chief Justice Roberts's reasoning could, in a subsequent iteration, be reconfigured to yield a clear-statement rule regarding congressional delegation of substantial, as distinguished from routine, lawmaking power. Such an approach would mean that a court would be less likely, in resolving the first part of the Mead analysis, to conclude independently that Congress had delegated lawmaking power to the agency. The inadequacy of ambiguity in this context of the scope of delegated power would be closely analogous to the elephants-in-mouseholes canon advocated by Justice Scalia in determining whether an otherwise ambiguous statute nevertheless has a clear meaning because a clear-statement rule applies.' 58 In
Gonzales, the Court did rely in part on this clear statement canon when the Court declined to accord Chevron deference to an Interpretive Regulation issued by the DOJ to interpret the CSA. 1 59 Notwithstanding a facially ambiguous statute, such an inferred limit on the agency's scope of authority would necessitate amendment of the statute before the agency could exercise the power that the Court has concluded Congress may delegate to an agency only when it has enacted a statute that clearly gives the agency such authority.
Mead does not itself resolve the extent to which courts may or should employ presumptions to discern the nature of lawmaking power delegated by Congress to an agency. Presumably, a court is to apply the traditional tools of statutory construction when it decides whether Congress has delegated lawmaking power to the agency. 160 The clarity and development of administrative law would have been Based upon Justice Scalia's longstanding loathing for the Court's decision in Mead, he is likely happy simply to ignore Mead's applicability to further his own ends. Why would Chief Justice Roberts, however, ignore the significance of Mead to the question whether an agency is to be accorded Chevron deference by a court? Although Mead and Gonzales may not have established precisely the limits that Chief Justice Roberts appeared to be advocating in City ofArlington, Mead still has already defined two important threshold requirements for the application of Chevron deference. The Chief Justice should have focused on the application of those accepted limits rather than on seeking to define new limits. If the Chief Justice had attended to Mead, he may have seen that the Mead approach properly accounts for the role of courts, Congress, and agencies in modem public law.
CONCLUSION: THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF CITY OF ARLINGTON
A critically important value animating Mead is that the application of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute is dependent on the actions of each of the two non-judicial actors in modem public law: Congress and the administrative agency responsible for executing the law. Mead holds that before an agency is accorded judicial deference, Congress must have delegated relevant lawmaking power to that agency. 162 This is the first of two actions. In the event Congress has delegated such lawmaking power, the agency must actually have exercised that delegated power when interpreting the statute. Exercising delegated lawmaking power will typically involve notice and comment rulemaking or formal authority to consider traditional aids to statutory construction. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 n.9 (1984) . adjudication procedures. 163 In both of these administrative contexts, the required procedures-by involving parties interested in the exercise of the lawmaking power contemplated by the agency-help ensure a fully and fairly considered exercise of agency lawmaking power. This agency action is the second of the two non-judicial actions, and Mead requires both before the court will accord Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation.
None of the decisions in City ofArlington properly accounts for this value and understanding of Mead. Justice Scalia chose to ignore altogether the Mead limitation on judicial deference. Justice Breyer understood the Mead limitation but concluded that deference to the FCC was appropriate only by providing an ipse dixit conclusion about the FCC's exercise of the lawmaking power that he concluded Congress had delegated to the FCC.1" Chief Justice Roberts hoped to limit the power of agencies by constraining the scope of application of Chevron deference. He suggested that when a court considers the first of the Mead questions, a broad, general grant of lawmaking power may not be sufficient to authorize agency lawmaking in specific contexts.
165
If courts were to take that approach, Skidmore review rather than Chevron deference would apply in a broader range of cases. This approach would also make the second of the Mead inquiries-whether the agency actually exercised the delegated lawmaking power-less important. This approach would accordingly be less attentive to the action of the agency in determining whether Chevron deference should apply. The focus would be more firmly fixed on the statute enacted by Congress and the rules of interpretation, including the rules of clear statement, fashioned by the judiciary, in many cases after the time of enactment.
That the Chief Justice sought to articulate in City ofArlington a new limit on the scope of Chevron deference is ironic for two reasons. First, Congress had delegated broad lawmaking power-"plenary authority" in the words of Justice Breyer 16 6 -to the FCC regarding regulation of telecommunications, and Congress had not defined an "express[] ... exception" to that authority.' 67 Second, a 166 See id. at 1877 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
167 Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, the Court in Gonzales had contrasted the circumscribed law making power delegated to the Attorney General in that case with the broad restrained court would resist opining about the extent of lawmaking power that Congress had delegated to an agency when the agency had not purported to exercise any lawmaking power. In such a case, there is surely no need for a properly restrained judiciary to determine whether lawmaking authority had been delegated.
The Court's decision has the potential to undercut significantly the impact of Mead because it is unlikely that many statutes will clearly limit the delegation of lawmaking power to an agency. The decision may accordingly be read as establishing that a court must defer to an agency's decision that it has received delegated authority when the statute is ambiguous. Such an approach may be defensible if defined as a presumption of legislative intent.
6 ' The approach, however, directly conflicts with Mead, if it is understood as a context for deference to the agency. The decision also undercuts Mead because application of the accepted, proper Mead analysis would have foreclosed the application of Chevron deference. Practitioners of administrative law can only be confused by the application of Chevron deference, given the administrative action reviewed in City of Arlington and the fact that neither reviewing court actually bothered to apply the Mead test before proceeding to accord Chevron deference. 169 Because none of the decisions properly framed the Mead analysis, perhaps the likeliest effect of the Court's decision is that it will simply yield greater confusion about the proper standards for judicial review of agencies' legal determinations.
That the majority decision is joined by Justices who have accepted the significance of Mead and its limitations on the application of Chevron deference surely means that the significance of Justice Scalia's decision is uncertain. That City of Arlington has overruled Mead sub silentio would be remarkable. More likely, the decision means only that when properly applicable (following the Mead analysis), Chevron deference extends to agency interpretations that define the extent of the agency's jurisdiction. 70 This understanding of the decision would be lawmaking power that Congress had delegated to the FCC regarding telecommunications. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 258-59.
entirely noncontroversial. Because the meaning of the decision is unclear, perhaps its impact will be limited. 17 1 That lack of clarity is a consequence of the Court's activist agenda and failure to exercise restraint in the application of its own precedent.
interpretation of a statutory provision that effectively defines the scope of the agency's jurisdiction); see also id. at 22-25 (arguing that defining a limit on Chevron deference based on whether the provision limited the agency's jurisdiction would be unworkable).
